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Geoffrey Jackson. The Empire on the Western Front: The British
62nd and Canadian 4th Divisions in Battle. Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 2019. Pp. 348.
While there are many divisional histories of the Western Front during
the First World War, it is rare to find a comparative analysis between
divisions within the British Empire. While academics such as Bill
Rawlings, J. L. Granatstein and Shane Schreiber have attempted to
contrast the outstanding battle performance of Dominion divisions
against their British counterparts, their works lacked evidence from
the British perspective.1 More broadly, Canadian historians have
focused on how the Canadian Corps’ successes and unique aspects,
such as its classless and largely volunteer composition, contributed
to a national identity. Alternatively, British historians have noted
the contribution of British leadership and technical assistance to the
Canadian Corps as well as the “excessive” publicity Sir Max Aitken,
the official Canadian War Reporter, garnered for “his” Canadians in
the press (p. 5). But until now, no one has methodically compared
specific Dominion and British divisions.
In The Empire on the Western Front: The British 62nd and
Canadian 4th Divisions in Battle, Geoffrey Jackson compares the
British 62nd Division with the Canadian 4th Infantry Division, not to
explore which was more effective, but to better understand the context
in which they operated. Jackson compares these divisions because of
their similarities: both recruited in late 1915 and into 1916 as volunteer
militia or territorial forces and separately participated in five major
battles in late 1916 to 1918. In fact, Jackson argues that the 62nd
and 4th were far more similar to each other than previously thought
regarding their recruiting, training, doctrine, leadership and tactics and
he contends that the 4th Division was no more effective than the 62nd
in battle from these perspectives. Jackson also argues that the key
differences between the divisions were the 4th’s size, which was larger
than the 62nd in 1918, and the fact that the 4th often had more time
to prepare for engagements, resulting in a reputation for effectiveness.

Bill Rawlings, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps,
1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Shane B. Schreiber, Shock
Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the
Great War (Westport: Praeger, 1997); and J. L. Granatstein, The Greatest Victory:
Canada’s One Hundred Days, 1918 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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By taking this comparative approach, he builds on the works of British
historians Paddy Griffith, Gary Sheffield, Peter Simkins and Andy
Simpson and the new generation of Canadian historians that take a
broader and more critical approach to Canadian battle performance.2
Jackson’s comparative approach also provides a specific case study of
the learning process in the British and Canadian divisions as discussed
in Aimée Fox’s Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change
in the British Army, 1914-1918.3
The book’s chapters examine each division during different
periods of the war. The introduction, Chapter Two “First Months in
the Line” and the conclusion provide a comparative analysis between
the two divisions; whereas, the remaining chapters focus on each
division separately at specific periods during the war, including how
the divisions were raised, trained and led as well as their battle
performance. Jackson also compares the divisions’ participation in
five engagements between the Battle of the Somme in 1916 and the
end of the war by leveraging six factors for comparison: expectation
for the division in each operation; the commanders and their
command relationships; support available to the unit; the nature
of the ground and weather; knowledge about the enemy and their
capabilities; and how the division rebuilt after an operation. Jackson
draws his analysis from Canadian, British and German records,
including war diaries from a range of military hierarchies such as
battalions, brigades and divisions. Further, Jackson uses the personal
Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of
Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Paddy Griffith, British
Fighting Methods in the Great War (London: F. Cass, 1996); G. D. Sheffield and Daniel
Todman, eds., Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s
Experience, 1914-1918 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2007); Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s
Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007);
Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front
1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006); Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian
Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1999); Geoffrey Hayes, Michael Bechthold and Andrew Iarocci,
eds., Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press, 2007); Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division at
War, 1914-1915 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Kenneth Radley, On
the Dangerous Edge: British and Canadian Trench Raiding on the Western Front
1914-1918 (Solihull: Helion & Company Limited, 2019); and Douglas E. Delaney
and Serge Marc Durflinger, eds., Capturing Hill 70: Canada’s Forgotten Battle of the
First World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2019).
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Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British
Army, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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diaries of division commanders to illuminate command decisions and
add a nuanced human element to the prosaic and often understated
official war diaries (p. 8). Jackson’s use of the War Office Stationery
Service training pamphlets also shows how these frequent doctrinal
and training updates provided more realistic training.
Jackson concludes that the 62nd and 4th used the same doctrine,
training techniques and equipment and incorporated lessons learned
equally well. Further, while the 4th lacked the pre-war professional
officer and non-commissioned officer strength of the 62nd, and
was comprised of lower middle-class recruits compared to the
upper middle-class of the 62nd, these differing social compositions
had little impact on battlefield performance. Both divisions had
equally effective leadership and staff officer coordination despite the
4th having a militia officer as a commander. Where the divisions
differed, Jackson explains, was in their deployment and usage. The
4th stayed within the Canadian Corps and never had its brigades
loaned out, while the 62nd served in seven different corps and often
had its brigades detached for service in other divisions. As such,
the 4th’s commander was more familiar with the personalities at
the corps level than the 62nd with its various corps commanders
and staff. For Jackson, this impacted the 62nd’s ability to question
orders, obtain clarifications or offer counter proposals when compared
to the 4th’s better rapport with the Canadian Corps. Additionally,
for the last year of the war, the 4th Division was three battalions
larger, meaning it could engage in longer battles. Jackson notes that
the Canadian Corps was very effective in obtaining extra time for
training and preparation for its battles, in part because they were
set piece large scale limited objective attacks; in contrast, the 62nd
was twice thrown into battle with very little preparation and were
unsuccessful in those battles as a result. In essence, the 62nd had
more structural constraints imposed upon it than did the 4th that
reduced its effectiveness in battle.
This book proves invaluable to those interested in comparing the
British home island divisions with Dominion units to understand if the
latter, especially in a Canadian context, deserve the prominence they
receive in the First World War literature. The author is commended
for tackling two sets of “national” literatures to accomplish this long
overdue transnational analysis.
bradley shoebottom, university of new brunswick
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